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Abstract
In this paper we show that in a bargaining situation the seller may
not necessarily want to fully exploit communication possibilities. In
the standard two-period bargaining model with one-sided incomplete
information, the seller, who owns an indivisible good, makes oers
which the buyer can either accept or reject. We ask whether the
seller can prot from manipulating the communication mechanism by
sending oers that reach the buyer with probability less than one
(noisy communication). Noisy communication is a way to improve
the seller's second period beliefs about the buyer's willingness to pay
for the good and is therefore a way to "buy" commitment. We study
the case of a discrete distribution of buyer's types and show that there
exist equilibria with noisy communication when there are at least three
dierent types of buyers.
Keywords: Bargaining, Communication, Incomplete Information.
1 Introduction
In this paper we show that in a bargaining situation the seller may not nec-
essarily want to fully exploit communication possibilities, even if they are
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available at zero cost. We assume that the seller has no private information;
nevertheless, strategic considerations induce him to refrain from communi-
cating to the buyer with maximum eectiveness.
More specically, we consider the Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) model
of bargaining with one-sided incomplete information, where one seller and
one buyer bargain over one indivisible object. There are two periods. The
seller's valuation is common knowledge and the buyer's valuation is private
information. In the original model, the seller makes an oer in period 1,
which the buyer can either accept or reject. If the buyer accepts, the game is
over; if he rejects, the seller can make another oer in period 2. Again, the
buyer can either accept or reject the second oer; if he rejects, the game ends
and the object is left unsold. We alter this basic structure by assuming that
the messages sent by the seller may not hit the buyer with a probability that
is controlled by the seller. We show that the seller may gain from sending
messages in the rst period that are received by the buyer with a probability
strictly lower than 1 (noisy communication).
It is not clear to us what could prevent a seller from introducing some
frictions into the communication process, and therefore we feel that a proper
modeling of the bargaining process should allow for such a strategy. Our
theoretical analysis is consistent with the observation that communication
possibilities are sometimes voluntarily underexploited. For instance, some
shops do not post prices. To make an example which is closer to the subject
of this paper, our analysis may help explain why the owner of a house (in
a small village, say) may somewhat conceal his willingness to sell, informing
only a few people and letting the information circulate by word of mouth,
instead of resorting to more eective ways of communication, even if the
cost of more intense advertising would be negligible compared to the value
of the transaction. This kind of behavior seems to be frequent in bargaining
situations1.
1At rst, one may think that incomplete information about the seller's valuation could
provide an alternative explanation; that is, this behavior may be used as a signal. How-
ever, on reection, while it is reasonable for the seller to signal through an abnormally high
price, it seems dicult to understand why he would not contact all potential buyers. Thus
incomplete information by itself is not sucient to explain noisy communication. Our
analysis, that assumes that the seller has no private information, shows that it is not nec-
essary either. Whether noisy communication can be optimal under two-sided incomplete
information is an issue that we leave for further research.
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The intuition for our result is as follows. By assumption, the seller cannot
commit to a xed sequence of oers. As a consequence, if the rst oer is re-
jected, he will have an incentive to reduce the second period price, as shown
by Fudenberg and Tirole (1983). Anticipating this behavior, the buyer will
reject some rst period oers that he would otherwise have accepted. But
if the seller sends messages that do not hit the buyer with probability one,
his second period beliefs about the buyer's willingness to pay will be more
optimistic than in the case of deterministic messages. This translates into a
higher second period price. In short, the seller uses noisy communication to
'buy' some commitment. Of course, noisy communication is costly as some
opportunities for immediate agreement are foregone, and showing the opti-
mality of noisy communication requires proving that the strategic advantage
illustrated above may outweigh the cost.
Another interpretation of the model is that the seller is a durable-goods
monopolist selling to a number of consumers whose willingness to pay for
the good is distributed according to a known distribution function. In this
context, the counterpart of noisy communication is that the seller rations
randomly a fraction of consumers at the rst period. This interpretation is
developed in a companion paper (Denicolo and Garella, 1996), where the case
of a continuous distribution of consumers' types is analyzed. In this paper, we
focus on the case of a discrete distribution, which allows a more transparent
analysis of the comparative advantages and costs of noisy communication.
To the best of our knowledge, the behavior analyzed in this paper has not
been discussed in the literature so far. However, related problems have been
treated in the bargaining literature and in the game-theoretic literature on
communication.
In the bargaining literature, the basic communication structure of Fuden-
berg and Tirole (1983) has been changed in a number of ways. For instance,
Muthoo (1994) considers the possibility that the oer is not irrevocable. In
his model, the seller can choose to withdraw his oer after the buyer has ac-
cepted it. Admati and Perry (1987) study a model with two-sided incomplete
information where the players can choose the time between oers, and use
this instrument to signal their bargaining strength2. The general message of
these papers is that the structure of the bargaining process can be manip-
ulated by the players in order to gain a strategic advantage. The present
2See also Ma and Manove (1993) and, for a survey, Kennan and Wilson (1993).
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paper adds to this literature.
Noisy communication between players has been explicitly modelled in
the game-theoretic literature. Rubinstein (1989), in a paper on common-
knowledge where no bargaining problem is involved, assumes that messages
sent by players have an exogenously given probability of getting lost. Com-
munication has also been studied in the literature on cheap-talk in sender-
receiver games (see Forges, 1986 and Farrell, 1993). Myerson (1991) discusses
an example due to Farrell where if the informed player sends a noisy message
with a probability 1/2 of being received, an equilibrium is reached in which
both players get a payo exceeding the one they can get in any equilibrium
with noiseless communication. But obviously sender-receiver games are quite
dierent than bargaining models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present the model in
section 2. In section 3, we provide a characterization of equilibria where the
seller does not fully exploit the possibilities of communication (Equilibria
with Noisy Communication, ENC). In section 4 we analyze the case where
the buyer can be one of two types, showing that no ENC exists in this case.
The three types case is studied in sections 5 and 6. It is shown that ENC's
exist in the three type case. We also briey discuss, in section 7, the eciency
properties of ENC. Section 8 concludes.
2 The Model
Assume that a bargaining involving an indivisible good can last for two trad-
ing periods. The seller's valuation of the good is public information, and
is strictly lower than any possible valuation of the buyer; thus, without any
further loss of generality, it can be normalized to zero. The buyer's valuation,
v; is instead private information. The seller has a probability distribution
F (v) over some support

v
 
; v

, with v >v> 0, which is common knowledge.
Both players are risk neutral. The seller's utility is simply equal to the
discounted price t 1pt ( t = 1; 2 ) if the object is sold, and zero otherwise;
the buyer's utility from buying at date t is given by
u = t 1(v   pt); (1)
where  is a discount factor common to both players.
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In a one-period model, the seller would simply communicate with proba-
bility 1 an oer p where p = argmaxp p[1 F (p)]. We shall refer to p as the
static optimal price. To simplify the exposition, we assume that p[1  F (p)]
is strictly quasi-concave so that p is unique:
At each period t = 1; 2, the seller sends a message which is an irrevocable
oer to sell the good at a specied price pt. The seller chooses also the
probability 1  t in (0; 1) that the message hits the potential buyer. There
is no cost of increasing this probability. If the buyer receives the message
and accepts the oer, the object is sold. Finally, we assume that if the buyer
receives the message he can also observe t, but the seller cannot observe
whether the buyer has received the message or not.
It is clear that in the second period the seller has nothing to gain from
choosing t > 0, for this could only lower the probability that an agreement is
reached without increasing the equilibrium price. Without loss of generality
therefore we can dene a strategy of the seller as a triplet (p1; ; p2;), where
p1 is the rst period price,  = 1 is the noise in the rst period message,
and p2 is the second period oer which is made with zero noise, conditional
on disagreement in the rst period.
In the second period, the buyer's decision problem is trivial and he will
accept the oer if and only if p2  v. If the buyer does not receive the
message in the rst period he has no decision to take. Thus, a strategy for
the buyer can be described simply as a rst period reservation price, b.
One may wonder whether the buyer who has not received any oer could
tell the seller that the message went lost, or whether the buyer who has not
accepted an oer could send a negative reply to the seller. Since this behavior
will make noisy communication ineective thus destroying the ENC, a seller
who would gain from noisy communication, would want a buyer to reply
only if he accepts a received oer. In this paper, we assume that the seller is
empowered to choose the communication structure and therefore we assume
that the buyer cannot send unwanted messages. For instance, the seller could
use an appropriate electronic device, or instruct a middleman to transmit
only acceptances.
If the seller could commit to a prescribed price sequence, it would be
optimal to set p1 = p2 = p and the solution to the seller's problem would
be trivial. We assume, however, that the seller cannot commit to a sequence
of oers. This implies that the second period price will be set in order to
maximize second period prots, given rst period choices. We look for the
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perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game.
In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, conditional on no agreement in the
rst period, p2 will be set so as to maximize p2 Pr(v  p2), where Pr(v  p2)
is the revised belief that the buyer's willingness to pay is higher than p2 con-
ditional on disagreement in the rst period. On the other hand, the buyer's
reservation price b(v) will satisfy the condition that the buyer is indierent
between accepting and rejecting a rst period oer p1 = b(v). Since the
buyer can anticipate the second period price in case of a disagreement, b(v)
will satisfy (v   b) = (v   p2), so that:
b(v) = (1  )v + p2: (2)
A rst period oer p1 will therefore be accepted by a buyer whose valuation
is at least
v1 =
p1   p2
1  
; (3)
and will be rejected if the buyer's valuation is lower than v1. This holds both
with perfect and noisy communication; all that changes is the value of p2
(which in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium is anticipated by the buyer).
3 A Characterization of Equilibria with Noisy
Communication
An equilibrium with noisy communication (ENC) is an equilibrium where
the seller sets  > 0.
In this section we prove that any ENC necessarily entails a rising pattern
of named prices. Moreover, the second period price is always equal to the
static optimal price (i.e. the price if bargaining lasted one period only).
proposition 1 At any ENC, p2 > p1.
All proofs are in the Appendix.
The intuition is that if, contrary to the Proposition, p2 < p1 and  > 0,
then the seller could increase prots by decreasing  and increasing p1 in such
a way as to leave Pr(v  p2) unaltered over the relevant range. This would
increase rst period prots, while leaving expected second period revenue
unchanged, thus showing that the initial strategy is sub-optimal.
Proposition 1 has a simple corollary:
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corollary 1 At any ENC, p2 = p > p1.
The reason is that when p2  p1 the optimal strategy to the buyer is to
set b = v (he cannot gain by waiting for the second period oer) and therefore
at any ENC the second period price will solve the maximization problem
max
p
(1  )p [1  F (p)] (4)
provided the solution is greater than p1: It follows immediately that p2 = p
if p > p1. If instead p1  p; then it would be optimal to set p2 = p1; but
by Proposition 1 this cannot be an ENC.
This completes our general characterization of ENC's. In order to address
existence, we further specialize our model assuming a discrete distribution
function. We rst consider the case of two types of consumers and show that
there cannot be equilibria with  > 0 in that case. Then we turn to the case
of three types, where ENC's exist.
4 Two types
In this section we assume that the buyer's valuation is vH with probability xH
and vL < vH with probability xL = 1 xH . Letting  = 0 by assumption, one
obtains exactly the model analyzed by Fudenberg and Tirole (1983). They
show that equilibrium takes one of the following forms:
(i) p1 = vL, all buyers accept immediately;
(ii) p1 = (1  )vH + vL and p2 = vL, a high valuation buyer accepts the
rst oer and a low valuation buyer accepts the second oer;
(iii) p1 = vH, this oer is rejected by a high valuation buyer with proba-
bility y; if the buyer does not accept, the seller makes a second oer which is
again vH. Here y is determined so as to make the seller indierent between
setting p2 = vH and p2 = vL: This requires that the probability that the
buyer be of type H in case the rst period oer is rejected, updated by the
Bayes rule, is vL=vH, that is:
yxH
yxH + (1   xH)
=
vL
vH
(5)
Fudenberg and Tirole's (1983) characterization of the equilibrium does not
consider the possibility of noisy communication. We show that this does not
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involve any loss of generality since noisy communication cannot be optimal
in the two type case.
proposition 2 With two types of consumers only there can be no ENC.
Intuitively, in the two type case the results of the previous section imply
that any ENC must involve p1 = vL. But then the only eect of setting  > 0
is to reduce the probability of agreement in the rst period without aecting
the seller's incentives in the second period, because the seller's posterior
beliefs about v will coincide with the ex-ante distribution. As a consequence,
at equilibrium it must be  = 0.
5 Three Types: Necessary Conditions for an
ENC
We now assume that the buyer can be one of three types. Let vH > vM >
vL denote the valuations of the three types, which are in proportions xH ; xM
and xL = 1  xH   xM .
In this section we describe situations where ENC's cannot emerge. This
analysis serves two purposes. First, it shows circumstances where the tradi-
tional analysis, that assumes away noisy communication, is valid. Second, it
provides necessary condition for an ENC.
We begin with a useful lemma.
lemma 1 In the three type case, setting p1 = vL cannot be part of a ENC.
The intuition for this result is similar to that behind Proposition 2.
An immediate implication of this lemma, combined with Proposition 1 and
Corollary 1 is that a ENC can exist only if the static optimal price is vH .
proposition 3 A necessary condition for a ENC is that p = vH.
That is, it must be vHxH > vM(xH + xM) (so that pricing at vM is
suboptimal in the one-period set-up) and vHxH > vL (so that pricing at vL
is not optimal).
Assume that p = vH . By Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 it then follows
that the candidate ENC involves setting p1 = vM and p2 = vH.
8
corollary 2 In the three type case, at any ENC, p1 = vM and p2 = vH.
Now suppose p1 = vM and consider the seller's problem at the beginning
of period 2. If vMxM > vL(xL + xM), then, irrespective of , it is optimal
to price at vM in the second period. This case is in fact equivalent to the
two type case considered in the previous section because the presence of
the lowest valuation type does not alter the seller's incentives in the second
period. Like in the two type case, it follows that noisy communication cannot
be optimal.
proposition 4 If vMxM > vL(xL + xM), there cannot exist any ENC.
To show existence of ENC's, hereafter we conne our attention to the
case where the above inequality is reversed.
6 Existence of an ENC in the Three Type
Case
In this section we show that ENC's exist in the three type case. Let us denote
h = vHxH, m = vM(xH + xM), and ` = vL. The rest of our analysis will be
based on the following restrictions on the parameters:
A1: h > m > `:
A2: vMxM < vL(xL + xM):
A1 guarantees that the static optimal price is vH, and at the same time
ensures quasi-concavity of the function p[1   F (p)]. Under A2, the three
type case is genuinely dierent from the two type one. Indeed, the strategy
of pricing so as to induce only the high valuation type to accept the rst
period oer and then setting p2 = vM without noisy communication (namely,
Fudenberg and Tirole's (1983) equilibrium of type (ii) restricted to high and
medium valuation buyers only)) under A2 is no longer subgame perfect. It
may still be optimal to set p1 so as to satisfy vH   p1 = (vH   vM), so that
a high valuation buyer, being indierent between accepting or refusing the
rst period oer, randomizes with an appropriate probability of rejecting.
But this equilibrium has now a cost to the seller because the revenue from
the high valuation buyer is delayed with a positive probability. Thus under
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A2 the presence of the lowest valuation type erodes the protability of this
pricing strategy (which does not involve noisy communication) and creates
a comparative advantage for noisy communication.
To proceed, we rst describe the subgame perfect equilibria that do not
involve noisy communication and that can emerge given assumptions A1-
A2. Then, we calculate the candidate ENC, and the corresponding expected
prot to the seller, using the results of section 3. Finally, we compare the
prot under the equilibria without noisy communication to the ENC prot
and show that the latter may be the highest for some parameter values.
6.1 Full communication subgame perfect equilibria
The equilibria with full communication that can emerge given A1-A2 are
described in the following proposition.
proposition 5 With three types of buyers, if A1-A2 hold, only three types
of full communication equilibria can emerge, namely:
H) p1 = p2 = vH;
M) p1 = (1  )vH + vM and p2 = vM ,
L) p1 = (1  )vH + vL and p2 = vL:
Equilibria H and M involve the use of mixed strategies on the part of the
buyer, with the highest valuation buyer randomizing appropriately between
buying soon or waiting with probabilities
yH = max
"
vMxM
xH(vH   vM)
;
vL(xM + xL)
xH(vH   vL)
#
:
and
yM =
vL(xL + xM )  vMxM
xH(vM   vL)
of waiting, respectively.
All other possible pricing strategies either are not subgame perfect or
yield lower prots. On the other hand, it can be shown that each one of
equilibria H, M, and L may occur for certain parameters values.
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6.2 The candidate ENC
The candidate ENC can be easily characterized using the results of the pre-
vious sections. It must be p1 = vM and p2 = vH. The necessary amount of
noise  in the rst period message is given by the condition that the seller
does not nd it protable to lower the second period price. It is clear that
p2 = vM cannot be optimal for any  given that vH is the optimal static
price. Hence, it must be xHvH  (xL + xH + xM)vL; that is
 
vLxL
xH(vH   vL)  vLxM
 ~: (6)
Conditions A1 and A2 imply ~ < 1.
The corresponding expected prot is:
NC = (1   )m+ h (7)
and is therefore linear in : Thus we can restrict our attention to the points
 = ~ and  = 1.
In particular, if m < h the optimal strategy with noisy communication
would involve  = 1, so that bargaining is eectively delayed to the second
period. However, setting p1 = vM and p2 = vH with  = 1 cannot be the
globally optimal strategy. Indeed, the seller could do better at the equilib-
rium where the price is equal to vH in both periods with  = 0 and the
high valuation buyer randomizes, like in strategy H described in Proposi-
tion 5 above. This would yield prots higher than h. Therefore, only the
ENC with  = ~ can dominate the full communication strategies and thus
it will be our unique candidate ENC3. The expected discounted prot at the
candidate ENC is therefore:
NC = (1  ~)m+ ~h: (8)
Obviously NC is increasing in :
3This implies that  < m=h is a necessary condition for noisy communication since it
guarantees that  = ~ is superior to  = 1. Actually, even stronger conditions must be
satised to obtain an ENC, as we shall show presently.
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6.3 Comparison
In order to understand the advantages of noisy communication, we now com-
pare the candidate ENC to the equilibria described in Proposition 5. It is also
instructive to compare these equilibria with the full commitment optimum.
Let us begin with equilibrium L, which is the only full communication
equilibrium that does not involve mixed strategies. Equilibrium L indeed
illustrates the typical Coasian dynamics: an agreement is reached with cer-
tainty and in the rst period the seller is unable to extract all the rent from
the high valuation buyer who can wait for the price discount in the second
period. Expected prot is:
L = (1  )h+ ` (9)
It is obvious that if players are impatient ( is close to zero), then the seller
retains much of its bargaining power. Indeed, for  = 0 the solution coincides
with the full commitment optimum. As players get more patient, however,
expected prot falls, and achieves a minimum of vL at  = 1:
Noisy communication is a way to limit the scope for strategic rejection by
the high valuation buyer because the possibility that the buyer has not been
reached by the message eliminates the seller's incentive to cut the second
period price. Thus, at the candidate ENC, we have p2 = vH like under
full commitment. However, as compared to the full commitment strategy
p1 = p2 = vH that yields the static optimal prot, noisy communication
involves two types of costs. First, in the rst period the price is lower than
vH which involves a loss of expected revenue. Second, the agreement is
delayed to the second period with positive probability. While the former
type of cost is independent of , the latter becomes less and less important
as  increases. As a consequence, for low values of , equilibrium L is superior
to noisy communication but when  approaches 1 it can be easily checked
from (8) and (9) that the candidate ENC gives higher prots:
lemma 2 NC < L for
0   
h  (1  )m
h(1 + )   l
;
and NC > L for
h  (1   )m
h(1 + )  l
   1:
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Equilibria H and M can be subgame perfect only if the buyer uses mixed
strategies. Equilibrium H mimics the equilibrium with full commitment in
that the price sticks to the static optimal level in both periods. However,
subgame perfection requires that the buyer randomize with a suciently large
probability of rejecting the oer in the rst period (since a high valuation
buyer gets zero surplus, he is indierent between accepting the rst period
oer or waiting and so can randomize). The cost of subgame perfection is
therefore given by the discounting of a fraction of static optimal revenue.
Expected prot is:
H =
h
1  (1   )yH
i
h (10)
where yH is determined by the subgame perfection constraint (see the proof
of Proposition 5 in the appendix for details). Clearly, equilibrium H is equiv-
alent to the full commitment strategy at  = 1 but its protability decreases
as the discount factor  decreases.
The candidate ENC is similar to equilibrium H in that in both cases
p2 = vH. Moreover, the candidate ENC also involves delaying the agreement
with a positive probability. However, noisy communication not only leads
to a positive belief that the buyer be of the highest type in period 2 but it
also lowers the belief that the buyer has medium valuation because a medium
valuation buyer would have accepted the rst period oer. As a consequence,
the probability 1-~ that a high valuation buyer is hit by the message in the
rst period at the candidate ENC is higher than the probability 1-yH that
a high valuation buyer accepts the oer in the mixed strategy equilibrium
H. This means that the share of expected revenue from the high valuation
buyer that is delayed is lower at the candidate ENC than at equilibrium
H. As a consequence, for low values of  the candidate ENC may dominate
equilibrium H as can be checked comparing (6.3) and (6.5):
lemma 3 NC < H for
(1  ~)m  (1   yH)h
h(yH   ~)
   1;
and NC > H for
0   
(1  ~)m  (1  yH)h
h(yH   ~)
;
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provided (1   )m > (1   yH)h: If, instead, (1   )m  (1   yH)h, then
strategy H dominates the candidate ENC for all values of :
Let us nally consider equilibrium M. This involves both the cost of
Coasian dynamics (like equilibrium L) and of delayed revenue (like equi-
librium H). Indeed, if A2 did not hold, the high valuation buyer could accept
with probability 1 the rst period oer without upsetting equilibrium M; in
this case, as shown by Proposition 4, noisy communication cannot be op-
timal. But when A2 holds the possibility that the buyer's valuation be vL
would destroy perfection of equilibrium M, unless a high valuation buyer
reject the oer with a suciently high probability. Expected prot is:
M = (1  )yMh+ (1  yM)m (11)
where yM is the probability that a high valuation buyer rejects the rst period
oer. The higher the incentive to cut the second period price to vL, the higher
is yM , and therefore the higher is the cost in terms of delayed expected
revenue. The cost of delayed revenue may be so high that equilibrium M
becomes likely dominated by the candidate ENC.
To summarize, our informal discussion suggests that equilibrium H will
occur when  is close to 1, equilibrium L will occur when  is close to 0, and
the candidate ENC can be optimal for intermediate values of . We now
conrm this conjecture.
proposition 6 A necessary and sucient condition for an ENC to exist in
the three type case under A1-A2 is
(1  )m  (1  yH)h
h(yH   )
>
h  (1  )m
h(1 + )  l
: (12)
In fact, if the above inequality holds, then there is a non empty interval
(;) such that ENC's exist if and only if  2 (;):
A numerical example will show that condition (6.7) is consistent with
A1-A2, and will also help to illustrate the above discussion. Let vH = 700;
vM = 420; and vL = 140, and let xH = 2=7; xM = 1=7; and xL = 4=7. The
optimal static price is then 700 and the corresponding (full commitment)
prot to the seller is 200.
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Then, under strategy H, a high valuation buyer accepts the rst period
oer with probability 1=4 so that expected discounted prots to the seller
are H = 50 + 150.
Under strategy M, a high valuation buyer randomizes between accepting
the rst period oer or not with probability 1/2; total discounted expected
prots are M = 100 + 80:
Strategy L yields prots L = 200  60.
Finally, in the candidate ENC the noise in the rst period oer is  =4/7
and total discounted prots are NC = (540 + 800)=7.
Figure 1 illustrates NC; H; M and Las functions of . Strategy M is
never optimal. The candidate ENC yields the highest discounted prot for
43=61    19=25 (approximately, 0:705    0:76):
7 Eciency Properties of ENC's
As is well known, bargaining equilibria may be ex-post Pareto inecient as an
agreement may fail to occur even when it would be in both parties interest,
or it may be delayed.
Can noisy communication improve the eciency of the bargaining pro-
cess? Surprisingly, it turns out that it can. However, there are also cases
where noisy communication results in an even more inecient outcome than
the standard equilibrium without noisy communication.
The example discussed at the end of the previous section may help illus-
trating the welfare consequences of noisy communication. They obviously de-
pend on which type of equilibrium without noisy communication is displaced
by the ENC. In the example, the ENC displaces equilibrium of type L for
43=61 <  < 5=7 and it displaces equilibrium of type H for 5=7 <  < 19=25.
When the ENC displaces equilibrium H, eciency clearly increases, for
two reasons. First, there is a positive probability that an agreement is reached
with a type M buyer in the rst period. Second, there is larger probability
that an agreement with a type H buyer is reached in the rst period. Another
way to conrm that expected social welfare (i.e., the sum of expected seller's
and buyer's surpluses) is increased is to note that in the ENC the buyer
obtains a positive expected surplus, and the seller obtains a larger prot
than in the displaced equilibrium H. Thus noisy communication need not be
socially inecient.
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When the ENC displaces equilibrium L, things are more complex. In
equilibrium L, an agreement is always reached. Moreover, a buyer of type H
will always reach an agreement in the rst period. These two eects tend to
make equilibrium L more ecient than the ENC. However, in the ENC there
is a positive probability that a type M buyer will reach an agreement in the
rst period, which cannot happen in equilibrium L. In our example, one can
easily verify that equilibrium L is superior to the ENC on eciency grounds.
To sum up, we have shown that there are circumstances where noisy com-
munication, in addition to being protable to the seller, also leads to greater
social welfare. In fact, even the buyer may gain from an ENC displacing a
type-H equilibrium, in which case the ENC Pareto dominates the equilibrium
without noisy communication.
8 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have shown that a seller may nd it protable to introduce
some frictions into the communication mechanism in a bargaining situation.
The reason is that this allows him to buy some commitment, which is valuable
in bargaining.
Our analysis assumes that the seller makes all oers, and also decides the
communication structure. In the bargaining literature, models have been
studied where the buyer plays a more active role, for example making coun-
teroers. In the present framework, allowing the buyer to play more actively
would lead to the question of whether he could also gain from manipulating
the communication mechanism. For instance, the buyer may wish to use
noisy communication himself, or he may try to make it ineective the use of
noisy communication on the part of the seller. This opens many interesting
issues which are left for future research.
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9 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose to the contrary that p1 > p2 and  > 0 at
the equilibrium. If p1 > p2, then the probability of an agreement at date 2
is  [1  F (v1)] + F (v1)   F (p2) where v1 is given by (2.4). Consider now
a strategy where 0 = 0 and p1 is increased to p01, with a corresponding
value v01, in such a way that  [1  F (v1)] + F (v1) = F (v
0
1). Clearly, the
choice of p2 in the second period will not change, and hence the probability
of an agreement in the second period will be unaltered. Since the overall
probability of agreement 1  F (p2) also remains unchanged, the probability
of an agreement in the rst period is unaected. But p1 is increased, so that
expected prots must be higher. 2
Proof of Proposition 2. Our characterization of ENC's in section 3 implies
immediately that there can be no noisy communication if the optimal static
price is vL. Thus suppose that vHxH > vL, so that the optimal static price
is vH. Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 imply that at any ENC it must be
p2 = vH and p1 < vH. In this context the latter inequality implies p1 = vL,
since lowering the price below vL; as well as oering any price strictly between
vH and vL, is clearly suboptimal.
The expected prot at the candidate ENC is then
NC = (1  )vL + vHxH : (13)
Now notice that when p1 = vL, setting p2 = vH is optimal independently of
the value of  because vH is by assumption the optimal static price. Since
the choice of  is unconstrained and NC is linear in ; at the optimum either
 = 0 (implying that there is no noisy communication), or  = 1 (if vHxH >
vL). However, setting  = 1 eectively means that bargaining is deferred to
the second period. The seller's expected prot with this "deferring" strategy
is xHvH.
But the Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) strategy (iii) described in section 4
above dominates this deferring strategy. Indeed, let p1 = p2 = vH : A high
valuation consumer will then be indierent between accepting the rst or the
second period oer. Consider then the mixed strategy equilibrium where a
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high valuation consumer randomizes between accepting soon or waiting with
probabilities 1  y and y respectively, such that
yxHvH = (xL + yxH)vL: (14)
This implies that in the second period the seller will still nd it optimal to
oer vH. The prot at this equilibrium is (1  y)xHvH + yxHvH > vHxH:
Hence noisy communication is not optimal in this case. 2
Proof of Lemma 1. When p1 = vL, the optimal second period pricing
strategy is independent of  since the value of  does not alter the seller's
second period beliefs. It follows that in the case of noisy communication
expected prot is linear in , so that either  = 0 or  = 1 at the opti-
mum. Thus noisy communication can occur only if it is optimal to defer all
agreements to the second period. However, deferring all agreements to the
second period is dominated (for  > 0) by the strategy of oering vH in both
periods, with a positive probability of an agreement in the rst period, like
in the proof of Proposition 2 above. 2
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider the following subgame perfect equilibria,
which correspond to those considered by Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) in their
analysis of the two type case:
(i) p1 = (1  )vH + vM ; p2 = vM ;
(ii) p1 = p2 = vH:
At equilibrium (i), a high valuation consumer accepts the rst period
oer and a medium valuation consumer accepts the second period oer. At
equilibrium (ii), only high valuation consumers accepts the seller's oers and
they are indierent between reaching an agreement in the rst or in the
second period. In the resulting mixed strategy equilibrium, a high valuation
consumer randomizes: he accepts the rst period oer with probability 1 y
and wait for the second period oer with probability y, where y is determined
so as to make the seller indierent between setting p2 = vH and p2 = vM :
This requires yvHxH = vM(xM + yxH) or
y =
xMvM
xH(vH   vM)
(15)
where y  1 by condition vHxH > vM (xH + xM);which must hold by Propo-
sition 3.
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Since xMvM > vL(xL+xM) implies that when a high valuation consumer
accepts the rst period oer with probability 1 it is optimal to price at vM in
the second period (thus aiming at reaching an agreement with the medium
valuation consumer only), equilibrium (i) is clearly subgame perfect. To
check that equilibrium (ii) is also subgame perfect, it remains to be shown
that in period 2 it is not optimal to set p2 = vL, that is:
yvHxH  vL(xL + xM + yxH) (16)
This follows easily from the condition vHxH > vM(xH + xM). Thus (i) and
(ii), with y given by (7.3), are candidate subgame perfect equilibria and they
do not involve noisy communication.
In the mixed strategy equilibrium (ii) expected prot is:
(ii) =
"
1  (1   )
xLvL
xH(vH   vL)
#
xHvH: (17)
whereas at equilibrium (i) expected prot is:
(i) = (1  )vHxH + vL: (18)
By Corollary 2, on the other hand, we know that at any ENC p1 = vM
and p2 = vH. It follows that at the candidate ENC expected prot is:
NC = (1   )vM + xHvH: (19)
Now it is easy to check that:
max[(i); (ii)] > R; (20)
for all  < 1 and for all  > 0. This means that noisy communication cannot
be used at equilibrium. 2
Proof of Corollary 2. By Proposition 2 and Corollary 1, p1 must be lower
than the optimal static price, whereas by Lemma 1 it must be higher than vL.
Now suppose the optimal static price is vM . It follows that vL < p1 < vM ,
but this is clearly dominated by p1 = vM . 2
Proof of Proposition 5. Clearly, in the second period the optimal price
oer must be one of fvH; vM ; vLg : We have therefore three possible types of
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equilibria without noisy communication, labelled equilibrium L, equilibrium
M, and equilibrium H, according to whether the second period price is vL; vM
or vH, respectively.
Equilibrium H
For p2 = vH to be part of a subgame perfect equilibrium, the rst period
oer cannot be lower than vH. The probability y that a high valuation
buyer defers agreement to the second period must be such that pricing at
vH in the second period is optimal to the seller. This requires yHvHxH 
vM(xM+yHxH), so that pricing at vM is dominated, and yHvHxH  vL(xL+
xM+yHxH), so that pricing at vL is dominated as well. Both conditions must
hold and this implies
yH = max[
vMxM
xH(vH   vM)
;
vL(xM + xL)
xH(vH   vL)
]:
Expected prot is:
H =
h
1  (1  )yH
i
h:
Equilibrium M
For p2 = vM to be part of a subgame perfect equilibrium;it is necessary
that p1 6= vM . The reason is as follows. If p1 = p2 = vM , then a high
valuation buyer will strictly prefer to accept the rst period oer, whereas
a medium valuation buyer will be indierent between accepting the rst or
the second period oer. However, even if a medium valuation buyer waits
for the second period with probability 1, by condition A2 it would then be
optimal to set p2 = vL. On the other hand, setting p1 at a level such that
a high valuation buyer strictly prefers to wait for the second period oer
implies that in the second period p2 = vH is the optimal price. Thus the
only possibility is that of setting p1 at the highest level which makes a high
valuation buyer willing to accept the rst period oer instead of waiting,
i.e. p1 = (1   )vH + vM . Being indierent as to when to accept, a high
valuation buyer at equilibrium randomizes and accepts the rst period oer
with a probability (1  yM) such that:
vM(xM + y
MxH) = vL(xL + xM + y
MxH) (21)
that is, such that in the second period the seller does not nd it convenient
to lower the price in order to reach an agreement with low valuation buyers.
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This implies:
yM =
vL(xL + xM)  vMxM
xH(vM   vL)
: (22)
Note that yM  0 by A1. It must also be yM  1, that is ` < m, which
is satised by A1. Expected prot is:
M = (1   )(1  yM)h+ m: (23)
Equilibrium L
When p2 = vL, an agreement is always reached. Clearly, p2 = vL can
be part of a subgame perfect equilibrium only if the rst period price takes
one of the following values: a) p1 = vL; b) p1 = (1   )vH + vL, c) p1 =
(1   )vM + vL. With p1 = vL the agreement is reached immediately and
prot is `. With p1 = (1  )vM + vL both a high and a medium valuation
buyer will accept the rst period oer and prot is (1   )m + `: Finally,
setting p1 = (1   )vH + vL implies that only a high valuation buyer will
accept the rst period oer and yields prot (1   )h + `. By condition
A1, it follows immediately that this latter equilibrium dominates the other
ones. 2
Proof of Proposition 6. Inequality (6.9) implies that there is a non empty
interval of values of  where NC > L and NC > H. Thus we must show
that NC > M over at least a subset of this interval. To show this, it suces
to compare the values of NC and M at the upper bound of that interval,
i.e. at point
 =
(1  ~)m  (1  yH)h
h(yH   ~)
: (24)
At that point, by construction NC = H: Thus, we must show that
(1  yH)h+ yHh > (1   )(1   yM)h + m; (25)
that is
(yM   yH)h > 
h
(m  h + h(yM   yH)
i
: (26)
Substituting, we get
(yH   ~)(yM   yH)h2 >
h
(1   ~)m  (1  yH)h
i h
(m  h+ h(yM   yH)
i
:
(27)
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A sucient condition for (27) to hold is:
(yH ~)(yM yH)h2 >
h
(1   ~)h  (1  yH)h
i h
(m  h + h(yM   yH)
i
(28)
which is always true given A1. 2
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Figure 1
Values for  are reported on the horizontal axes, values for prots on the
vertical axes. The decreasing function is L, the prot under equilibrium L;
the increasing function with highest value equal to 200 is H; the prot under
equilibrium H; the increasing function which starts above H ,and terminates
just below it, is NC, the prot with noisy communication. The value of M ,
the prot under equilibrium of type M does not exceed that of NC for any
value of , and therefore it has not been reported.
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